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I.  Introduction 
 The potential threat of entry can influence the strategies of incumbent firms.  Seemingly 
imminent entry changes both a pre-entry and a possible post-entry competitive landscape.  How 
these landscapes change may depend as much on the entrant as the cast of current producers.  
The new firm can have little or no competitive market experience, or it can enter with a history 
of rivalry from other and perhaps related markets.  The entrant can establish links to other 
markets if it operates in more than one market.  It then becomes a conduit through which events 
in one market impact behavior in other markets.  In general, learning in one market can be 
transferred to other markets through the conduit firm. A web of multimarket producers creates 
interacting market connections (Phillips and Mason 2001).  
 An example of entry combined with multi-market participation is provided by an antitrust 
case involving the Swedish packaging giant Tetra Pak.  Known as a major global provider of 
aseptic packaging, in the late 1980s and early 1990s Tetra Pak acquired firms that allowed it to 
compete in the market for non-aseptic packaging.  Prior to these acquisitions, the market for non-
aseptic packaging was dominated by two firms, Elopak and PKL (García-Gallego and 
Georgantzís, 1999).  Tertra Pak’s entry plans were widely announced.  These plans created a 
different set of behavioral incentives for the already existing firms in that market.  Following the 
acquisitions, Elopak Italia complained that Tetra Pak’s business practices brought economic 
harm to Elopak; an indication that post-merger rivalry was intense.  The European Competition 
Commission ultimately decided against Tetra Pak.1  While the competition authority’s primary 
focus was on the post-event behavior, we maintain there were important implications for pre-
merger behavior in the non-aseptic packaging market.     
Imminent entry of the sort described above creates a transition to different market 
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structures.  There is a period of time during which the already-producing firms have a reasonable 
belief that another firm will enter the market.  This may be known because capital is being put in 
place, or there has been an announcement that a new firm is planning to begin operations.2  Also 
as communities develop, some firms have widely known business plans to extend operations as 
populations or household incomes reach a target level.3  One can also think of a scenario in 
which entry is imminent once a patent expires.4  Alternatively, one can imagine the appointment 
of a new anti-trust authority that takes a far more aggressive stance towards existing oligopolies, 
and takes actions that facilitate entry.5  During this transition are incumbent firms more or less 
cooperative compared to the identical market structure without the threat of entry?  How does 
behavior compare in the post-entry period to a market structure that has a long history with no 
threat of entry?   
In this paper we study transitions before and after the time that entry may occur.  
Behavior can be modeled with firms using trigger strategies to punish non-cooperative actions.  
The repeated game has a known transition point at which the number of firms possibly increases 
by one. There may be no actual entry, but until the transition point there is a threat.  If entry 
occurs, it is either from a newly formed firm entering, or an established firm extending its 
operations into another market.  While the analytics suggest that rivals are less cooperative as a 
result of the threat of entry, it is difficult to predict behavior after the possible time of entry.  In 
order to learn more about pre- and post-entry behavior we construct experimental duopoly and 
triopoly markets, where as a baseline, quantity choosers go for an indefinite period of time 
without any threat of entry.  We compare this behavior to duopoly markets that have a threat of 
entry.   
We construct two experimental market environments that involve potential entry.  In one 
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design the entrant is a new firm that has no other market contact.  In a second design, when entry 
occurs it comes from a duopoly firm extending its operations into a second market.  Here, the 
entrant becomes a multi-market firm; this allows strategic learning to be transferred across 
markets. 
Our results show that potential entry inhibits collusive tendencies, as one would expect; 
this effect arises whether or not entry transpires.6  Perhaps more surprisingly, this effect persists 
past the date of potential entry.  Because there are a multiplicity of equilibrium strategy 
configurations in an indefinitely repeated game, such as the one we study, subjects may gravitate 
towards a less collusive regime when entry is more likely; this tendency then gets “locked in” 
and so survives past the date at which entry could occur, whether or not entry transpires.  As 
such, the results suggest that public policy can measurably inhibit collusive behavior by more 
generally creating a probability of entry, which would include taking actions that reduce entry 
barriers. 
 
II. Experimental Market Designs 
 A description of the experimental design will present a clearer picture of the market 
structures before and after the announced date of entry.  Subjects make choices from a payoff 
table for an indefinite number of periods.  In a duopoly game the row choice made by one 
subject is the column value of a rival.  The intersection of the row and column in the payoff table 
shows earnings for the period.  The payoff table represents the normal form of a stage game 
(Friedman, 1983).  The use of payoff tables in experiments has a history that predates their 
description of oligopoly markets.  Rapoport, Guyer and Gordon (1976) and Colman (1982), for 
instance, provide extensive surveys of literally hundreds of experiments that use payoff tables to 
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generally learn more about rivalry and bargaining behavior.  Surveys of how researchers have 
used payoff tables to study non-cooperative behavior are provided by Davis and Holt (1993, 
Chapter 2), Friedman and Sunder (1994, Chapter 9), Kagel and Roth (1995), and Plott (1989). 
  A schematic (Figure 1) of the experimental market structures before and after the period 
of potential entry is a helpful introduction to a description of the experimental design.  Before 
entry there are six duopoly markets with 12 subjects choosing quantity from a payoff table.  
Figure 1 at the top illustrates the pre-entry configuration.  There are 25 choice periods in the pre-
entry market structure.  
II.A.  Treatment I:  A Single Market Entrant 
In this experimental design we recruit two additional subjects as potential entrants in the 
six duopoly markets.  Altogether 14 subjects are recruited.  After everyone is seated, two 
subjects are randomly designated as entrants.  These people know that they will enter the game 
in period 26.  They make no choices during the first 25 periods, though they are able to view the 
choices of earnings of the players in the market they will enter.  Otherwise, these subjects have 
no market experience.  Subject who are actively participating in a duopoly market during the first 
25 periods of the game know that there is a 1/3 chance of entry.  In the bottom half of Figure 1 
we show subjects 13 and 14 entering markets 1 and 3, which then become triopolies for the 
remainder of the experiment.  The other four markets continue to operate as duopolies. 
II.B.  Treatment II:  A Multi-market Entrant 
In this design, subjects who will become entrants actively make choices in a different 
market in all periods.  Figure 1 at bottom illustrates the design.  As in treatment I, the probability 
of entry into a duopoly market at the end of period 25 is 1/3.  However, two of the duopoly 
markets became “conduit markets.” They are connected to another market through subjects who 
 5 
participate in two markets (in Figure 1, these are subjects 9 and 11).  The probability of a player 
becoming a multimarket operator, i.e. making choices from two tables, is 1/6.  Subjects were 
informed of these probabilities.7  Entry creates two triopoly markets (in Figure 1, these are 
markets 1 and 3).  This design leaves two duopoly markets that had a threat of entry at the end of 
period 25, but into which no entry occurred (in Figure 1, these are markets 2 and 4).  These 
markets are “siloed”, because the duopoly firms do not participate in any other markets.  Finally, 
the transition date creates two “connected” duopoly markets that had a threat of entry, but no 
entry in period 25, however one of the firms operates in two markets (markets 5 and 6).  After 
the transition period subjects make choices for at least 25 more periods.  Starting with period 50 
in both treatments I and II, there is a 20% probability of stopping at the end of each period.8 
II.C.  Baseline Treatments 
 As baseline treatments, 18 duopoly markets in two experimental sessions operated for 50 
periods with the same random end point; there was no possibility of entry, nor was there a threat 
of entry.  Eight triopoly markets were conducted the same way during two sessions of 12 
subjects each.  These two baselines allow us to test for differences in behavior under treatment 
designs I and II before and after period 25.  Altogether there are four experimental designs:  the 
two entry designs described in Figure 1 (four sessions with 12 subjects each), and two baseline 
duopoly and triopoly markets. 
II.D.  Instructions and Basic Market Conditions 
 Subjects for all experimental sessions were recruited from upper level undergraduate 
economic classes.  They reported to a reserved classroom with a personal computer at each seat.  
At the beginning of a session, instructions were read aloud as subjects followed along on their 
own copy.  Questions were taken and one practice period was held with sample payoff tables 
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different from those used in the experiment.  The samples showed a table when two people made 
a row choice, and a table for which three people made a row choice.  Several examples of row 
choices were covered in both a duopoly and triopoly game.  Earnings were measured in a 
fictitious currency called tokens.  At the end of the experiment, tokens were exchanged for cash 
at the rate of $1.00=1000 tokens. 
 In each market period subjects were instructed to type their row choices into their 
personal computer.9  Subjects were anonymously matched for the duration of the experiment, 
and matched individuals were not seated close to each other.  Once everyone had made their 
choices, the linked computer screens reported back to subjects their choices, earnings, and 
balance.  Subjects kept track of this information and they always could check the computer’s 
calculations from the payoff tables provided to them.  Subjects were informed of the choices and 
earnings made by a rival or rivals.  Finally, all participants knew that if there was some 
probability of entry, it would occur in period 26.  The second part of treatments I and II would 
have at least 25 periods.  Subjects were informed that there was an 80% chance of continuing 
after period 50.  After period 50, the computer would randomly generate a number between 0 
and 100, and the experiment would end in the period the random number did not exceed 20.  
Sessions generally ended between periods 50 and 55, and took about 2 hours; earnings averaged 
about $25 per subject.10  
 All of the experimental market designs described in Figure 1 are constructed as two or 
three person repeated games, where the payoff tables are derived from linear demand conditions. 
The inverse demand function in the market is QQP −= 60)(  where .32,
1
ornqQ
n
i
i ==∑
=
  There 
are no variable costs of production, though agents face fixed costs of 75.  Reduced-in-size copies 
of the two and three person games are contained in Appendix A.11   
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 Subjects were never told they were picking outputs, just that they were choosing values 
from a payoff table where the intersection of their row choice and the other player’s column 
choice determined earnings for the period.  In treatments I and II, subjects were told that in 
period 25 the tables may or may not change to a larger version with three people choosing row 
values.  The instructions also informed all subjects that they could be making row choices from 
two tables in each period.   
 For reference, several possible equilibrium choices can be identified in the payoff tables.  
In the duopoly games the static Cournot/Nash quantities are .20=iq   Complete symmetric 
collusion occurs at .15=iq   In the triopoly games, the static Cournot/Nash quantity is at 15=iq  
and the complete symmetric collusive choice occurs at qi = 10. 
 
III.  Hypotheses 
Our experimental setting can be represented as a dynamic game in which there is a shock 
to the system.  Players reach tacit agreement using trigger strategies,12 but they must cope with a 
change in the market structure in which they are aware of the probability of change at a known 
point in time.  Hence we discuss pre-entry and post-entry behavior.13 
There are two critical points in time: the end of period 25, when the uncertainty regarding 
the potential entry is resolved, and the end of period 50, when the random termination 
commences.  We use “epoch 1” to refer to periods 1 through 25 and “epoch 2” to refer to choice 
periods after period 25.  During epoch 1 there are two players, 1 and 2, who simultaneously 
select outputs q1t and q2t in each period t.  In epoch 2, the number of players either changes from 
2 to 3, with probability 1-λ, or the number remains 2; this number applies for the remainder of 
the game.  Whether or not entry occurred, all players choose outputs simultaneously in each 
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period in epoch 2.  Finally, starting with period 50, the game terminates at the end of each period 
with probability 1-θ ∈ (0,1) (and so with probability θ the game continues to the next period).   
 The central question we study in this paper is: how does the threat of entry affect the 
ability to tacitly collude?  Intuitively, the threat of entry reduces the value of continued 
cooperation, and so one expects to see larger outputs when there is a threat of entry than where 
no such threat exists.  On the other hand, behavior in advance of entry must surely entail smaller 
outputs than would be observed in a 3-firm industry.  Accordingly, there are two testable 
hypotheses associated with our experimental design during epoch 1: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  An experimental design with two firms and potential entry will have larger 
outputs than will an experimental design where the number of firms is fixed at 2; 
 
and 
 
Hypothesis 2:  An experimental design with two firms and potential entry will have smaller 
outputs than will an experimental design where the number of firms is fixed at 3. 
 
Notice that Hypothesis 1 does not hold true in a standard Cournot/Nash framework: in such an 
environment, firms would produce the Cournot output with or without the threat of entry.  It is 
only when there is a tendency to produce smaller outputs in a tacitly collusive environment for 
which the threat of entry will matter.   
 A natural way to model the post entry period is as an indefinitely repeated game with a 
fixed number of players, under which deviation from a cooperative regime induces perennial 
reversion to the one-shot Cournot/Nash equilibrium (Gibbons (1992), pp. 102-107).  With this 
backdrop in mind, a natural expectation is that subjects in markets that did not experience entry 
at the end of the first phase will choose outputs that on average are more cooperative than the 
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Cournot/Nash duopoly level.  But the nature of this strategy is such that firms maintain whatever 
level of cooperation they had achieved during the first epoch.  That suggests a third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  In the experimental design with potential entry that does not materialize, behavior 
in epoch 2 will not differ from behavior in epoch 1.  
 
 In some of our experimental markets, subjects operate in two markets in epoch 2; these 
subjects make choices in a duopoly and a triopoly and so face two distinct incentive constraints.  
As we describe in Phillips and Mason (2001), it is likely one of these markets will be more 
cooperative than the other.  Different degrees of cooperation could reflect different degrees of 
“rationality” among players that emerges from their history of play (Kreps (1990)).  This 
potential heterogeneity motivates subjects to learn about their rival(s) mode of behavior, and may 
facilitate a similar level of cooperation in the two markets.  One can think of learning as altering 
the incentive constraint(s), by changing the weight put on future returns, and this will change the 
quantities at which the incentive constraints bind.  
 It is possible that the multimarket producer, in order to interpret the actions of different 
rivals, treats all rivals as having a single common strategy.  The multimarket producer therefore 
uses the same rule by which to adjust to the actions of different rivals.  In turn, this strategy may 
force the X and Y market rivals to adjust quantities in different directions.  The strategy of the 
multimarket agent may break “the constraint” in the Y market and crate slack in the X market. 
The conduit firm will generate market outcomes very similar to that of the same firms meeting in 
different markets.  
 The foregoing discussion suggests that behavior in experimental duopolies may differ 
when one compares regimes where both players operate in just the one market with regimes in 
which one player operates in both the duopoly and a second market.  In our experimental design, 
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this comparison is readily available in treatment II for epoch 2: of those pairs that did not 
experience entry (and so remain a duopoly), half of the pairs include a subject who has been 
placed in a second market while the other half included subjects that are participating in one 
market only.  In the discussion below, we term the second cohort “no entry, no multi-market” 
and the first cohort “no entry, multi-market.”  An interesting behavioral question addresses the 
comparison of these two cohorts. 
 
IV. Econometric Model 
We now turn to a rigorous analysis of choices in our pre-entry and post-entry 
experimental design. The goal is to estimate the equilibrium choice for a typical agent. We 
analyze the experimental data by treating each session as a pooled cross section time series.14  In 
the sample, the cross-sectional element is given by the number of participants, with the number 
of observations per subject determined by the length of the session in which he or she 
participated. 
 The structural model we estimate to test these hypotheses is based on the relation 
Cit= αi + εit,       (1) 
where Cit represents the market output chosen by subject pair i in period t, αi is the equilibrium 
or "steady-state" choice for pair i, and εit is a disturbance term.  Because subjects’ decisions are 
simultaneous, an individual's choice can be influenced only by a counterpart's past choices. As 
an individual adjusts his or her choices in approaching equilibrium, the history of the game 
provides important information. This can occur either because agents are learning about their 
rival's rationality (Kalai and Lehrer, 1993) or because of signalling, aimed at coordinating on a 
more profitable regime (Shapiro, 1980). The implication is that the disturbance term in equation 
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(1) may contain subtle dynamic effects more than first-order ones. The most parsimonious time-
series structure that includes such subtle effects is a second-order autoregressive process, which 
yields: 
Cit = bi + ρ1Cit-l + ρ2Cit-2 + uit,      (2) 
where bi = ai(l - ρ1 - ρ2), and we impose the regularity conditions |ρ1| < 1, |ρ2| < 1, and |ρ1 + ρ2| < 
1 (Fomby, Hill and Johnson, 1988). 
To estimate this regression model, we regard our dataset as a balanced panel; this 
requires the same number of observations for each element of the cross-section, i.e., each subject 
pair.  In each case, we estimated the system of equations defined by equation (2) for all subject 
pairs, allowing intercepts to vary between subject pairs in a given treatment, and slopes to vary 
between different treatments.   
We propose a fixed-effects approach to analyze choices. This approach assumes that 
variations between subjects within a given design can be captured through differences in the 
intercept term, bi.15 However, the dynamic adjustment terms, ρ1 and ρ2, as well as the variance of 
the disturbance term, uit, are assumed equal for all pairs in a given design.  Also, we assume no 
contemporaneous covariance between subject pairs and that uit is serially uncorrelated: 
E(uitujw) = 0 if i ≠  j or t ≠ w, 
where w is a time period different from t. 
With this structure, it is straightforward to obtain asymptotically efficient, consistent 
estimates of the parameters bi, ρ1 and ρ2.  Once consistent and efficient estimates of these 
parameters are obtained, we construct the average intercept in design n as  
 βn =  Σ bi /Nn,       (3) 
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where Nn is the number of pairs in treatment n.  We are interested in the equilibrium behavior of 
a typical subject in each of the treatments.  If agents choose the steady-state value for several 
consecutive periods, then the deterministic version of equation (2) may be used to derive the 
equilibrium output for subject pair i in treatment n as 
ai = bi/(1 - ρ1 - ρ2).     (4) 
Because we are interested in the central tendency in each design, we then use these 
estimates of each pair's equilibrium to obtain the average choice for the design:  
   αn = Σ ai /Nn = βn/(1 - ρ1n - ρ2n).       (5) 
Finally, we can use covariance information from the maximum-likelihood estimates of βn, ρ1n 
and ρ2n to construct consistent estimates of the covariance structure for the steady-state values αn 
for each treatment n (Fomby, Hill, and Johnson, 1988). 
 
V.  Results 
 We now turn to a discussion of our empirical analysis.  We start by discussing the 
summary statistics, and then proceed to the formal econometric results from analysis of each of 
the two epochs. 
V.1.  Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the baseline and treatment sessions are presented in Table 1.  For 
each of the experimental designs, we list mean, standard error, minimum and maximum choices 
for the experimental markets.  In the duopoly baseline treatment, three sessions with 6 subject 
pairs in each session participated, for a total of 18 markets.  In the triopoly baseline treatment, 
two sessions with 4 subject groups each participated, for a total of 8 markets.  In Treatment I, 
four sessions were conducted with 14 subjects in each session. In epoch 1 there were 6 duopoly 
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markets in each session while in epoch 2 there were 4 duopoly markets (identified by the row 
“no entry”) and 2 triopoly markets (identified by the row “entry”).  In Treatment II, three 
sessions with 6 subject pairs in each session participated.  Altogether, there were 18 pairs in 
epoch 1.  At the end of epoch 1, two subjects from each session were randomly placed into a 
second market, so that 6 triopolies were formed.  Throughout epoch 2, these six individuals 
participated in two markets, or had multi-market (MM) participation as illustrated in the second 
half of Figure 1.  The same six subjects continued to make choices in their respective duopoly 
markets; the corresponding market choices are summarized in the Treatment II row labeled “no 
entry, MM”.  The other 12 subjects made choices during epoch 2 in duopolies where neither 
subject participated in more than one market; the data from these subjects is summarized in the 
row labeled “no entry, no MM.”   
The Table 1 summary shows that average duopoly market choices in the two treatment 
sessions increased relative to the baseline during epoch 1.  Specifically, average duopoly choices 
are 38.42 in Treatment I and 38.06 in Treatment II, while average duopoly choices are 35.48 in 
the baseline.   
With respect to epoch 2, in the treatment sessions where the potential entrant would only 
operate in the market under consideration (i.e., the entrant would not be multi-market), average 
choices are 37.69 (in Treatment I) and 41.29 (in Treatment II).  By comparison, the average 
choices in the duopoly baseline are 37.84.  Average choices in the Treatment sessions during 
epoch 2 where entry did occur are 41.19 (in Treatment I) and 44.61 (in Treatment II), which are 
larger than the average choices of 40.76 in the triopoly baseline in epoch 2.   
Treatment I triopoly choices are less than choices of 42.75 during epoch 1 in the triopoly 
baseline, however average triopoly choices from both treatments are greater. The standard errors 
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associated with these choices are fairly large, so determining the statistical importance of these 
effects requires a more thoughtful approach. 
V.2  Data and Analysis: Epoch 1 
We apply the regression model to each of four experimental designs.  In Figure 2 average 
choices in the duopoly baseline, for which there is no threat of entry, are plotted as short-dashed 
lines and labelled “Baseline duopoly”.  Choices as market output begin at about 35 units and 
fluctuate around this level for all periods during epoch 1.  The Cournot/Nash quantity is 40 for 
the market, so there is a noticeable degree of tacit cooperation in the market that is sustained.  
The triopoly baseline, where there is no threat of entry and there are three players in each market 
throughout the experiment, is also graphed.  Average choices are plotted in Figure 2 as the long-
dashed line, which we label “Baseline triopoly”.  Average combined market output is 
consistently about 40 units, ranging between 40 and 45 units for the duration of epoch 1.  The 
Cournot/Nash quantity is 45 units.  The experimental data exhibit a tendency to produce a few 
units below this level.  Figure 2 also includes average choices from Treatment I, which we plot 
as the solid line, labelled “Treatment I.”  These choices are generally greater than those in 
Baseline duopoly and smaller than those in Baseline triopoly.   
Figure 3 contains the two baseline designs, along with average choices from Treatment 
II, which we plot as the solid line labelled “Treatment II.”  As with the average choices in 
Treatment I shown in the preceding figure, these choices are consistently greater than average 
choices in the duopoly baseline., and smaller than average choices in the triopoly baseline 
(though they are closer to the Cournot/Nash choice of 40 than those in Treatment I). 
The data summarized in Figures 2 and 3 are directly relevant to the two hypotheses we 
posed above.   The results from our regression model, as applied to each of the two treatments, 
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are provided in Table 2.  In this table, parameter estimates for αn, ρ1n and ρ2n are presented for all 
four experimental designs as labelled and described in Table 2.16  The corresponding standard 
error is given, in parentheses, below the relevant point estimate.  We also present the implied 
steady state choice, βn, along with its standard error (in parentheses).  Below these estimates we 
give the R2 goodness of fit statistic for the regression, as well as the number of observations.  
We note first that for all designs, the estimates of 𝜌! and 𝜌! are all less than one in 
magnitude, as is |𝜌! +  𝜌!|. Thus, the conditions for dynamic stability are satisfied, so we may 
properly regard the estimated value of βn as the steady-state choices in each design n.  
Comparing the designs, we see that the estimated steady state choice in Treatment I (38.44) is 
virtually identical to the estimated steady state choice in Treatment II (38.31); the difference 
between these estimates is statistically insignificant.17  For both treatments, the estimated steady 
state choice is significantly larger than the estimated steady state choice for the duopoly baseline, 
and significantly smaller than the estimated steady state choice for the triopoly baseline.  All 
these differences are statistically different from 0 at better than the 1% confidence level, 
confirming our two propositions.  This set of experiments confirms Hypothesis 1, that the threat 
of entry leads duopoly players to produce more during epoch 1. 
V.3  Data and Analysis: Epoch 2 
 Figure 4 plots post entry duopoly choices from Treatments I and II, along with baseline 
choices from duopoly markets that had no threat of entry.  These plots suggest that subjects in 
Treatment I behaved similarly to subjects in the duopoly baseline during epoch 2, where as 
subjects in Treatment II were significantly less cooperative.  Choices in these latter sessions 
generally hover around the Cournot/Nash level of 40, but appear to increase with greater 
variance.  These observations suggest the potential entry by a multi-market firm in Treatment II 
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exerts a lingering effect upon any cooperative tendencies, even after the time at which entry 
could occur has passed – a theme we return to below. 
Indeed as Table 3 reports, the difference between βI, the estimated steady state choice 
level for subjects in the threatened duopoly Treatment I (which equals 37.60), and β2, the 
estimated steady state choice level of subjects in the duopoly baseline session (which equals 
37.65), is statistically insignificant.  In contrast, the difference between β2 and the estimated 
steady state choice level for subjects in the threatened duopoly Treatment II is significant.  This 
is true both for subjects in markets where the potential entrant would make choices in multiple 
markets (βIIb =40.13) and for subjects in markets where the potential entrant would only make 
choices in market facing potential entry (βIIa = 41.22) is significant.18  These latter estimated 
values, while significantly different from the estimated value for β2, are not significantly 
different from the Cournot/Nash choice of 40, nor are they significantly different from each 
other.  These observations suggest a role for the threatened entry via a multi-market firm during 
epoch 1.  The comparison of βI and β2, on the other hand, suggests that once the threat of entry 
passes in Treatment I, subjects’ cooperative tendencies are comparable to those in the duopoly 
baseline. 
Figure 5 plots post entry triopoly choices from Treatments I and II, along with baseline 
choices from triopoly markets.  The baseline is clearly more cooperative than the newly created 
triopolies through the middle periods, though the differences between the baseline and the 
triopoly choices from Treatment I tend to erode later in the sessions.  As with the results 
illustrated in Figure 4, however, differences between average choices between epoch 2 in the 
Treatment II sessions and the baseline sessions persist through the end of the experiment.   
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Table 4 presents results for choices from epoch 2 for those experimental markets that 
have three participants in that epoch.  The steady state choice level for the triopoly baseline (β3 = 
40.40) is not significantly different from the estimated steady state choice for subjects in 
Treatment I markets where entry occurred (βI = 41.30).  By contrast, steady state choices in for 
subjects in Treatment II markets where entry occurred (βII = 44.94) are significantly different 
from both the triopoly baseline sessions and the sessions in Treatment I.  
One possible explanation for the differences between Treatment II and the triopoly 
baseline is that once entry occurs all history is forgotten from the duopoly era, and players are 
working on tacit agreement with a clean slate.  To get at this idea, we compare average choices 
in the triopoly baseline during epoch 1 against average choices in the newly formed triopolies in 
the treatment sessions during epoch 2.  In Figure 6 we label the x-axis “round” to reflect the idea 
that any identified number k is the kth choice period in the corresponding structure.19  While there 
is considerable variance in choices, the three plots are roughly similar through round 21.  After 
round 21, however, choices in  the treatment triopolies diverge from choices in the baseline 
triopoly.  Thus, while the conjecture that history is forgotten has some merit, for a while, this 
effect does not appear to persist.20   
 
VII. Conclusion 
 Against the backdrop of duopoly and triopoly markets for which there is no threat of 
entry, we empirically investigate how firms behave in experimental markets when there is an 
imminent threat of entry.  When duopolists are completely informed of the time and probability 
of entry they are significantly less cooperative than firms without such a random threat of entry.  
Imminent entry enhances competitive behavior in all markets in the pre-entry period.   
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 Even if entry does not materialize, we find that compared to a baseline without a threat of 
entry, markets tend to be less cooperative in the post-entry period.21   Players are unable to 
overcome their competitive history.  An important element here is the multi-market presence for 
the potential entrant: the possibility for entry by such a player appears to mitigate cooperative 
tendencies in later periods.  In the second epoch, after the date of potential entry has passed, 
duopolies in which the potential entrant would not have had a multi-market presence (Treatment 
I) chose significantly smaller outputs than conduit duopolies, in which the potential entrant 
would have had a multi-market presence (Treatment II).  Triopolies where the entrant has a 
multi-market presence choose significantly greater quantities than triopolies where the entrant 
does not have a multi-market presence.  For both the conduit duopoly and triopoly the difference 
is about 10%. 
 These experimental results expand our understanding of how the threat of entry in 
oligopoly markets affects competitive behavior.  The threat posed as a randomized event 
independent of current output (and price) choices has the impact of making all markets in the 
threatened set of markets more competitive.  Our experiments are showing a significant output 
increase of 10%, with subject choices moving close to the Cournot/Nash choice.  We might 
expect that once the threat is past and agents are assured there is no further threat of entry that 
they would return to a level of tacit agreement described by baseline behavior that never had a 
threat of entry.  However, the experimental data show there is a lasting legacy of the entry event 
that carries forward into the indefinite future.   Markets that experience the random threat 
continue to be more competitive, continuing to behave as if they are Cournot/Nash players.   
 The econometric evidence in Table 2 suggests that public policies designed to make entry 
more likely can inhibit collusive tendencies, even if entry does not take place.  Moreover, the 
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evidence in Tables 3 and 4 indicates this welfare-enhancing effect is likely to persist beyond the 
point in time when entry may have occurred.  In the context of former European state 
monopolies that have been privatized, for example, our results suggest that policies that create a 
chance of entry in the future may have pro-competitive impacts prior to the date of potential 
entry.  It need not be the case that the path to entry is clear-cut or that a potential entrant is 
waiting in the wings if incumbent firms should raise price – the mere likelihood of such an event 
is sufficient to induce competitive behavior before and after the point in time possible entry can 
occur. 
 This work complements the contestable market arguments advanced by Baumol (1982) 
and others.  In the contestability literature, hit-and-run entry forces firms in concentrated markets 
to keep prices competitive.  There is always the understanding, however, that there are 
identifiable firms that will enter the market if monopoly profits are earned.  We argue that even 
without a clearly identified entrant, some probability of entry is sufficient to induce competitive 
outcomes.  Along this line, there clearly is room for more testing.  There are a host of questions 
for further study.  For example, how sensitive is competitive behavior in the pre-entry period to 
lower or higher probabilities of entry?  More realistically would a series of probabilistic entry 
points affect behavior?  Finally, how would the potential for future entry impact behavior in an 
environment where firms have established a collusive history prior to the announcement of 
potential entry?  One imagines that having established this collusive tradition, the existing firms 
might be more inclined to continue colluding even in the face of newly announced imminent 
entry.  This sort of scenario differs from the regime we have studied, where potential entry is 
made common knowledge at the outset.   
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
mean s.d. min max no. subjects 
no. 
markets 
Baseline duopoly 
       
 
epoch 1 35.48 7.979 16 50 36 18 
 
epoch 2 37.84 6.046 25 50 36 18 
  
 
     Treatment I 
       duopoly epoch 1 38.42 6.803 16 50 48 24 
no entry epoch 2 37.69 6.081 20 50 32 16 
entry epoch 2 41.19 9.436 18 67 24 8 
  
 
     Treatment II 
       duopoly epoch 1 38.09 7.926 10 50 36 18 
no entry, no MM epoch 2 41.29 7.964 17 50 12 6 
no entry, MM epoch 2 40.01 5.073 29 50 12 6 
entry epoch 2 44.61 8.394 28 69 18 6 
        Baseline triopoly 
       
 
epoch 1 42.75 9.131 24 69 24 8 
 
epoch 2 40.76 9.936 24 63 24 8 
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TABLE 2: Regression Results for Choices During Epoch 1 
parameter Baseline duopoly (n=2) Treatment I (n=I) Treatment II (n=II) 
Baseline triopoly 
(n=3) 
αn 38.87 33.44 30.72 45.13 
 
(2.785) (0.708) (3.234) (4.784) 
ρ1n -0.0634 0.0467 -0.0952 0.0788 
 
(0.0486) (0.0589) (0.0545) (0.0812) 
ρ2n -0.0547 0.0834 0.2933 -0.1312 
 
(0.0482) (0.0567) (0.0502) (0.0732) 
βn 34.76 38.44 38.31 42.88 
	
(0.250) (0.270) (0.344) (0.599) 
R2 0.490 0.396 0.510 0.212 
observations 460 552 414 184 
design duopoly baseline; 
two firms, no entry 
single market 
potential entrant 
 multi-market 
potential entrant 
triopoly baseline; 
three firms, no entry 
 
 
Note:  βI - β2 = 3.68; standard error = 0.657; t-statistic = 10.00  
 β3 - βI = 4.44; standard error = 0.692; t-statistic = 9.80 
 βII - β2 = 3.55; standard error = 0.427; t-statistic = 8.320  
 β3 - βII = 4.58; standard error = 0.692; t-statistic = 6.614 
 βI - βII = 0.13; standard error = 0.437; t-statistic = 0.297 
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TABLE 3: Regression Results for Choices During Epoch 2, Entry Does Not Occur 
parameter Baseline duopoly (n=2) Treatment I (n=I) 
Treatment IIa 
(n=IIa) 
Treatment 
IIb (n=IIb) 
αn 18.65 25.84 21.8 26.23 
 
(1.082) (0.998) (5.109) (3.003) 
ρ1n 0.248 0.302 0.508 0.151 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.17) (0.10) 
ρ2n 0.257 0.0113 -0.0037 0.195 
 
(0.0740) (0.0618) (0.0970) (0.0821) 
βn 37.65 37.60 41.22 40.12 
 
(0.510) (0.271) (0.803) (0.540) 
R2 0.534 0.649 0.615 0.349 
observations 276 384 150 138 
design duopoly 
baseline; two 
firms; no entry 
no entry; single 
market potential 
entrant  
no entry; 
neither firm is 
multi-market  
no entry; one 
firm is multi-
market  
 
Note:  βI - β2 = -0.05; standard error = 0.578; t-statistic = -0.087 
 βIIa - β2 = 3.57; standard error = 0.951; t-statistic = 3.753 
 βIIb  - β2 = 2.47; standard error = 0.743; t-statistic = 3.325 
βIIa  - βIIb = 1.10; standard error = 0.968; t-statistic = 1.137 
 βI - βIIa = -3.62; standard error = 0.847; t-statistic = -4.271 
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TABLE 4: Regression Results for Choices During Epoch 2, Entry Does Occur 
parameter Treatment I Treatment II Baseline 3 
αn 36.85 43.13 24.2 
 
(1.67) (2.30) (1.69) 
ρ1n 0.141 0.065 0.298 
 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
ρ2n -0.0329 -0.0246 0.103 
 
(0.0717) (0.0801) (0.0916) 
βn 41.30  44.94  40.40  
 
(0.548) (0. 638) (0.890) 
R2 0.527 0.245 0.479 
observations 184 138 184 
design entry; no multi-
market firms 
entry; multi-
market presence 
three firms, no 
entry 
Note:  β1 - β3 = 0.900; standard error = 1.045; t-statistic = 0.861 
 βII - β3 = 4.540; standard error = 1.095; t-statistic = 4.146 
 βII  - βI = 3.640; standard error = 0.841; t-statistic = 4.328 
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Figure 1:  Initial Market Structure:  Six Duopoly Markets; 12 quantity-choosing subjects.   
  
There are 25 choice periods in this part of the game. 
 
 Market    Subjects 
 
    1    1  2 
 
 
    2    3  4 
 
 
    3    5  6 
 
 
    4    7  8 
 
 
    5    9  10 
 
 
    6             11  12 
 
Reconfigured Market Structure: There are at least 25 choice periods in this part of the game. 
 
            Market              Treatment I:            Treatment II:                       
                                 New subjects 13 and 14 enter a market                   Subjects 9 and 11 enter a second market 
  
 1  1 2 …13  1  2     9    
 
 
2   3 4     3  4 
 
 
3  5    4 ….14  5  6     11 
 
 
4  7    8   7  8 
 
 
5  9    10   9  10 
 
 
6   11   ..12            11  12 
 
 
 30 
Figure 2: Average Choices in Epoch 1, Treatment I vs. Duopoly and Triopoly Baseline sessions  
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Figure 3: Average Choices in Epoch 1, Treatment II vs. Duopoly and Triopoly Baseline sessions  
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Figure 4: Choices in Epoch 2, Duopoly Baseline vs. Treatments with no Entry 
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Figure 5:  Triopoly Choices in Epoch 2 after Entry in Some Markets. 
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Figure 6:  Epoch 1 Triopoly Baseline vs. Epoch 2 in Treatments I and II with Entry 
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Notes 
                                                
1 This decision was upheld in 1996 following an appeal.  See Russo et al. (2010, pp. 153-158) for 
more discussion.  Evidently Tetra Pak attempted to work around this decision by acquiring the 
Italian firm Italpak; this led to a second major finding against Tetra Pak in 2004 (Siragusa and 
Baretta, 2008).  
2 Cabela’s, a large retailer of outdoor equipment and clothing, selects potential retail sites years 
in advance of building, and may choose not build a store after investing in a land site. Once the 
firm decides to go forward it will announce two or three years in advance that it is planning to 
open a new store, and begin construction.  In this way, incumbent retailers have probabilistic 
signals that are directly linked to Cabela’s decision to enter a geographic market (see, for 
example, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=177739&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=1990864; last accessed November 19, 2014).  
3 Yum! Brands Inc., owners of the restaurant chains KFC, Pizza Hut, and Taco Bell measures its 
growth opportunities in terms of restaurants/million people.  In the United States it averages 58 
restaurants per million people.  In its top emerging markets, Yum! Brands has 2 restaurants per 
million (http://www.yum.com/annualreport/).   It currently targets entry for its identified 
emerging markets: In the U.S., Yum! Seeks a minimum of 5,000 people in a trade area for a 
Pizza Hut franchise, and a minimum of 15,000 people in a trade area for KFC and Taco Bell 
restaurants (http://www.yum.com/company/realestate/documents/RealEstateContactsVisual.pdf).  
Once a community’s population reaches one of these thresholds, entry may occur. 
4 For example, the effect of entry after a patent’s expiration has been studied extensively in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  See Berndt et al (2003).  For discussion on behavior before entry see 
Ellison and Ellison (2011). 
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5  Of course, existing firms may take actions that impede entry.  Our focus abstracts from this 
possibility, and so is better viewed as a characterization of the potential effect of a shift in 
antitrust policy towards potentially collusive firms.  
6 An example of the sort of effect we have in mind here comes from the market for seamless 
carbon-steel pipes and tubes.  During the latter part of the 20th century, a cooperative 
arrangement was promulgated between European and Japanese manufacturers (collectively 
known as the “Euro-Japan club”) to rig prices.  This arrangement was destabilized in 1993 in the 
face of imminent entry by Latin American manufacturers, ultimately collapsing in 1995 (Russo 
et al. (2010), p. 58). 
7 For each of the entry treatments, an equal number of sessions were conducted without 
informing subjects of the probabilities of these events. 
8 Accordingly, these experimental games are not stationary.  The class of subgame-perfect 
equilibria that satisfy the incentive constraints in each period of the stationary game, as described 
in more detail below, also satisfy the incentive constraints in each period of nonstationary games 
such as these.  In other work (Phillips and Mason (1996)) we have created stationary duopolies 
and have found behavior no different from behavior in the nonstationary structure.   
9 In later sessions subjects were instructed to highlight their row choice with their mouse and 
then click an “ok” tab on their screen.  The instructions read to subjects for the design when there 
was a forthcoming threat of entry are provided in Appendix C, which is available online from the 
journal’s website. 
10 In the three duopoly baseline sessions, the experiments lasted 50, 51 and 53 periods.  In the 
two triopoly baseline sessions, the experiments lasted 50 and 51 periods.  In the three treatment 
sessions, the experiments lasted 50, 51 and 52 periods. 
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11 In order to avoid having a large number of negative payoffs in the first few rows of the 
triopoly table, we slightly increased payoffs for these rows.  This adjustment did not change the 
symmetric joint profit-maximizing combination, nor did it affect the Cournot equilibrium.   
12 A representative sampling of discussions on the use of trigger strategies includes Marschak 
and Selten (1978), Spence (1978), Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), Fudenberg and Tirole (1989) 
and Segerstrom (1988).  Papers that analyze the use of trigger strategies in an uncertain 
environment include Green and Porter (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Haltiwanger 
and Harrington (1991); these papers consider environments that are subject to stochastic 
influences in every period.  By contrast, our problem is one where the uncertainty is resolved at a 
certain time, with the structure permanently settled after the shock occurs – which is equivalent 
to one with a sequence of perfectly correlated shocks.   
13  Details of such a model are relegated to Appendix B. 
14 Experimental economists have often analyzed mean choices over a subset of the play in 
similar settings. Such an approach is inferior to our procedure because it neglects learning and 
dynamic adjustments, which can distort the results (Alger, 1987). 
15 Essentially, this approach employs a regression model with pair-specific dummy variables; the 
coefficients on the dummies reflect the underlying parameters ai. Alternatively, one can analyze 
the residuals from a regression with a common intercept, and allow for deviations from that 
intercept for pair i to arise through the average value of the residual for pair i. 
16 We use n to index the baselines and treatments, with n = 2 referring to the Baseline duopoly, n 
= 3 referring to the Baseline triopoly, n = I referring to the Treatment I and n = II referring to the 
Treatment II. 
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17  The data for Treatment II include all subjects, both those who participate in markets for which 
there is no entry and markets for which there is entry (in which case the entrant is a multi-market 
player).  
18 Behavior also differs significantly between Treatment I and Treatment IIa, which again 
indicates the threat of entry by a player that participates in multiple markets exerts a different 
impact from the threat of entry by a player that only participates in the market where entry may 
occur. 
19 So, for example, k = 5 corresponds to period 5 in the triopoly baseline, but period 30 in the 
post-entry triopoly from a treatment session. 
20  A comparison of subject behavior in markets where entry occurred in Treatment II with 
subject behavior where entry occurred in Treatment I reveals a statistically important difference 
(as indicated in the notes at the bottom of Table 4).  A comparison of the steady state choices in 
Treatment II across the structures (entry does not occur, no multi-market contact – IIa in Table 3; 
entry does not occur, multi-market contact – IIb in Table 3; entry does occur, multi-market 
contact – II in Table 4) also indicates post-entry behaviour is noticeably different when there is 
multi-market contact.  In our earlier work (Phillips and Mason (2001)), where we observed that 
producers in conduit markets behave as if they have a pooled incentive constraint: Operation in 
two markets leads to higher outputs in one market and lower outputs in the other. 
21 Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman (1999) also find that the potential arrival of new 
competition can erode cooperation, albeit in a different economic setting.  In their experiment, 
agents in a public goods contribution game are re-matched at regular intervals.  They find that 
tendencies to contribute, which correspond mathematically to tendencies to restrict output in an 
oligopoly game, are reduced as the time of reorganization draws nigh. 
APPENDIX A: Payoff Tables 
 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
8 227 269 261 253 245 237 229 221 213 205 197 189 181 173 165 157 149 141
9 312 303 294 285 276 267 258 249 240 231 222 213 204 195 186 177 168 159
10 345 335 325 315 305 295 258 275 265 255 245 235 225 215 205 195 185 175
11 376 365 354 343 332 321 310 299 288 277 366 255 244 233 222 211 200 189
12 405 393 381 369 357 345 333 321 309 297 285 273 261 249 237 225 213 201
13 432 419 406 393 380 367 354 341 328 315 302 289 276 263 250 23 224 211
14 457 443 429 415 401 387 373 348 345 331 317 303 289 275 261 247 233 219
15 480 465 450 435 420 405 390 375 360 345 330 315 300 285 270 255 240 225
16 501 485 469 453 437 421 405 389 373 357 341 325 309 293 277 261 245 229
17 520 503 486 469 452 435 418 401 384 367 350 333 316 299 282 265 248 231
18 537 519 501 483 465 447 429 411 393 375 357 339 321 303 285 267 249 231
19 552 533 514 495 476 457 438 419 400 381 362 343 324 305 286 267 248 229
20 565 545 525 505 485 465 445 425 405 385 365 345 325 305 285 265 245 225
21 576 555 534 513 492 471 450 429 408 387 366 345 324 303 285 261 240 219
22 585 563 541 519 497 475 453 431 409 387 365 343 321 299 277 255 233 211
23 592 569 546 523 500 477 454 431 408 385 362 339 316 293 270 247 224 201
24 597 573 549 525 501 477 453 429 405 381 357 333 309 285 261 237 213 189
25 600 575 550 525 500 475 450 425 400 375 350 325 300 275 250 225 200 175
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245
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APPENDIX B: Details of the Model 
 
In this Appendix, we describe the main elements of a game theoretic model that 
can be used to represent our experimental structure, and discuss conditions under which 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 will hold.   
As noted in the text, we use “epoch 1” to refer to periods t = 1,…,T1, where 
uncertainty regarding the potential entry is resolved at the end of T1, and we use and 
“epoch 2” to refer to periods t > T1.  There are two players, 1 and 2, in epoch 1; at the end 
of epoch 1 the number of players either changes from 2 to 3, with probability 1-λ, or the 
number remains 2; this number applies for the remainder of the game.  Starting with 
period T2, the game ends at the end of the current period with probability 1-θ ∈ (0,1).  In 
every period, all players choose outputs simultaneously; these outputs induce payoffs for 
player i by the stage-game payoff function π(qit, qIt), where qIt is the sum of all other 
players’ outputs.  We adopt conventional assumptions governing the stage-game payoff 
function: that it is strictly concave in own output, i.e. ∂2π/∂qi2 < 0, and that both π and 
∂π/∂qi are decreasing in qI (this latter assumption ensures reaction functions are 
downward-sloping).  These assumptions hold true for the linear-quadratic payoff 
structure we employ in our experimental design.  For later reference, we define the one-
shot Cournot/Nash output when there are k (symmetric) players as qkN; the corresponding 
profits are πkN.   
We propose the following strategy σ In epoch 1: choose q2c1 if both players have 
played q2c1 in all periods prior to period t; if either party deviated from q2c1 in any period 
prior to period t, play q2N.  If entry occurred at the end of period T1 then play q3c2 in 
period T1+1 if both players 1 and 2 played q2c1 in all periods of epoch 1, but play q3N if 
either player deviated from q2c in any period t ≤ T1; in any period τ > T1+1 play q3c2 if 
both players 1 and 2 played q2c1 in all periods of epoch 1 and all three players chose q3c2 
in all prior periods in epoch 2, but play q3N if either player 1 or 2 deviated from q2c1 in 
any period of epoch 1 or if any player deviated from q3c2 in any prior period of epoch 2.  
If entry did not occur at the end of period T1 then play q2c2 if both players 1 and 2 played 
q2c1 in all periods of epoch 1 and both players 1 and 2 played q2c2 in all prior periods of 
epoch 2; if either party deviated in any period prior to period t, play q2N.1 
We denote the payoffs a player earns if all n players use the strategy σ in epoch m 
as πncm Let us define qndm as the Nash best response when the other n-1 players have 
chosen qncm, n = 2 or 3, and m = 1 or 2.  We write the corresponding payoffs as πndm.  We 
assume the quasi-cooperative outputs qncm are such that the strategy σ can be part of a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium.  This requires the one-time gains from deviation to not 
exceed the future discounted losses in the three time frames: epoch 1, epoch 2 prior to T2, 
epoch 2 after T2.  Consider first values of t ≥ T2.  In this time frame, the incentive 
constraints take the form 
                                                
1  The strategy we propose is stationary, i.e. it is time-invariant.  Because of the relatively 
complex structure of the game, it is conceivable that players could adopt time-varying 
strategies.  Our view is that the most obvious manner in which strategies would change 
over time is linked to the potential for entry, which differentiates periods iin epoch 1 (t ≤ 
T1) from periods in epoch 2 (t ≥ T1 + 1).  It is also true that periods in epoch 2 prior to T2 
differ from period T2 and after, in that it is common knowledge the probability the game 
will terminate during the first set of dates is nil.  The discussion in the text can be adapted 
to incorporate this additional complication, but at the cost of complicating the exposition.  
πnd2 + θπnN/(1 − θ) ≤ πnc2/(1 − θ) ⇔ πnd2 - πnc2 ≤ θ(πnd2 - πnN). (A1) 
There are two versions of this constraint, one for n = 2 and one for n = 3.  Next, consider 
values of t in epoch 2 prior to T2.  Here, the incentive constraints take the form  
πnd2 + (T2-t-1)πnN + πnN/(1 − θ) ≤ πnc2(T2 – t) + πnc2/(1 − θ)  
⇔ πnd2 - πnc2 ≤ (1 − θ)(T2 – t)( πnc2 - πnN) + θ(πnd2 - πnN),    (A2) 
Clearly, the right-hand side of (A2) is larger than the right-hand side of (A1) for any t < 
T2.  Accordingly, we can ignore this constraint.  Finally, consider values of t in epoch 1 
(i.e., t ≤ T1).  Here, the incentive constraints take the form  
π2d1 + (T1-t)π2N + (T2-T1)EπN + EπN/(1-θ) ≤ π2c1 + (T1-t)π2c2 + (T2-T1)Eπc2 + Eπc2/(1-θ), 
where EπN = λπ2N + (1-λ)π3N and Eπc2 = λπ2c2 + (1-λ)π3c2.  This constraint is tightest at t 
= T1, where it reduces to 
(π2d1 - π2c1) ≤ {(1-θ)(T2-T1) + 1}(Eπc2-EπN)/(1-θ).  (A3) 
If the constraint in (A3) is not binding, then an increase in λ – for example, from 0 to 
some positive level – need not have any impact on π2d1 - π2c1.  But if the constraint is 
binding, so that full collusion is not feasible, then the impact of an increase in λ upon π2d1 
- π2c1 will be proportional to the impact of an increase in λ upon Eπc2-EπN.  Using the 
definitions of Eπc2 and EπN given above,  
Eπc2-EπN = λ[π2c2- π2N – (π3c2- π3N)] + π3c2- π3N. 
It follows that  
∂(π2d1 - π2c1)/∂λ ∝ π2c2- π3c2 – (π2N - π3N), 
the difference between the reduction in cooperative profits and the reduction in Cournot 
profits as industry size increases from 2 to 3.  If the drop in in Cournot profits exceeds the 
drop in in cooperative profits, then an increase in λ will induce less cooperative 
behaviour in epoch 1.  This condition can hold for a variety of market structures, 
including the linear-quadratic framework we employ in our experimental design.2  Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 can hold under the assumed condition that perfect collusion is not feasible 
and players adopt the strategy σ.  
 The potential for entry induces firms to increase output during epoch 1 because 
this threat lowers the expected reward from continued cooperation in epoch 2.  But the 
resultant expected reward is surely larger than the actual reward that would obtain in a 
triopoly.  Accordingly, the incentives to cooperate are larger in a design where entry is 
probabilistic than in a design where the industry size has already been set at 3.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 will hold so long as firms are not irrationally aggressive. 
 
                                                
2  Let the cooperative profit πnc2 be a convex combination of fully collusive profits πnM 
and the Cournot profits πnN, with weight γ placed on πnM.  Suppose in contrast to the 
statement in the text that this weight does not change between n = 2 and 3.  It is 
straightforward to show that the reduction in collusive profit when n increases from 2 to 3 
equals 1/6 of monopoly profit, while the reduction in Cournot profit when n increases 
from 2 to 3 cooperative is 7/36 of monopoly profit.  Thus, Cournot profits fall faster than 
collusive profits, as n increases from 2 to 3.  We conclude that the constraint (A3) 
becomes tighter when n increases from 2 to 3.  
APPENDIX A: Payoff Tables 
 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
8 227 269 261 253 245 237 229 221 213 205 197 189 181 173 165 157 149 141
9 312 303 294 285 276 267 258 249 240 231 222 213 204 195 186 177 168 159
10 345 335 325 315 305 295 258 275 265 255 245 235 225 215 205 195 185 175
11 376 365 354 343 332 321 310 299 288 277 366 255 244 233 222 211 200 189
12 405 393 381 369 357 345 333 321 309 297 285 273 261 249 237 225 213 201
13 432 419 406 393 380 367 354 341 328 315 302 289 276 263 250 23 224 211
14 457 443 429 415 401 387 373 348 345 331 317 303 289 275 261 247 233 219
15 480 465 450 435 420 405 390 375 360 345 330 315 300 285 270 255 240 225
16 501 485 469 453 437 421 405 389 373 357 341 325 309 293 277 261 245 229
17 520 503 486 469 452 435 418 401 384 367 350 333 316 299 282 265 248 231
18 537 519 501 483 465 447 429 411 393 375 357 339 321 303 285 267 249 231
19 552 533 514 495 476 457 438 419 400 381 362 343 324 305 286 267 248 229
20 565 545 525 505 485 465 445 425 405 385 365 345 325 305 285 265 245 225
21 576 555 534 513 492 471 450 429 408 387 366 345 324 303 285 261 240 219
22 585 563 541 519 497 475 453 431 409 387 365 343 321 299 277 255 233 211
23 592 569 546 523 500 477 454 431 408 385 362 339 316 293 270 247 224 201
24 597 573 549 525 501 477 453 429 405 381 357 333 309 285 261 237 213 189
25 600 575 550 525 500 475 450 425 400 375 350 325 300 275 250 225 200 175
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APPENDIX B: Details of the Model 
 
In this Appendix, we describe the main elements of a game theoretic model that 
can be used to represent our experimental structure, and discuss conditions under which 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 will hold.   
As noted in the text, we use “epoch 1” to refer to periods t = 1,…,T1, where 
uncertainty regarding the potential entry is resolved at the end of T1, and we use and 
“epoch 2” to refer to periods t > T1.  There are two players, 1 and 2, in epoch 1; at the end 
of epoch 1 the number of players either changes from 2 to 3, with probability 1-λ, or the 
number remains 2; this number applies for the remainder of the game.  Starting with 
period T2, the game ends at the end of the current period with probability 1-θ ∈ (0,1).  In 
every period, all players choose outputs simultaneously; these outputs induce payoffs for 
player i by the stage-game payoff function π(qit, qIt), where qIt is the sum of all other 
players’ outputs.  We adopt conventional assumptions governing the stage-game payoff 
function: that it is strictly concave in own output, i.e. ∂2π/∂qi2 < 0, and that both π and 
∂π/∂qi are decreasing in qI (this latter assumption ensures reaction functions are 
downward-sloping).  These assumptions hold true for the linear-quadratic payoff 
structure we employ in our experimental design.  For later reference, we define the one-
shot Cournot/Nash output when there are k (symmetric) players as qkN; the corresponding 
profits are πkN.   
We propose the following strategy σ In epoch 1: choose q2c1 if both players have 
played q2c1 in all periods prior to period t; if either party deviated from q2c1 in any period 
prior to period t, play q2N.  If entry occurred at the end of period T1 then play q3c2 in 
period T1+1 if both players 1 and 2 played q2c1 in all periods of epoch 1, but play q3N if 
either player deviated from q2c in any period t ≤ T1; in any period τ > T1+1 play q3c2 if 
both players 1 and 2 played q2c1 in all periods of epoch 1 and all three players chose q3c2 
in all prior periods in epoch 2, but play q3N if either player 1 or 2 deviated from q2c1 in 
any period of epoch 1 or if any player deviated from q3c2 in any prior period of epoch 2.  
If entry did not occur at the end of period T1 then play q2c2 if both players 1 and 2 played 
q2c1 in all periods of epoch 1 and both players 1 and 2 played q2c2 in all prior periods of 
epoch 2; if either party deviated in any period prior to period t, play q2N.1 
We denote the payoffs a player earns if all n players use the strategy σ in epoch m 
as πncm Let us define qndm as the Nash best response when the other n-1 players have 
chosen qncm, n = 2 or 3, and m = 1 or 2.  We write the corresponding payoffs as πndm.  We 
assume the quasi-cooperative outputs qncm are such that the strategy σ can be part of a 
subgame-perfect equilibrium.  This requires the one-time gains from deviation to not 
exceed the future discounted losses in the three time frames: epoch 1, epoch 2 prior to T2, 
epoch 2 after T2.  Consider first values of t ≥ T2.  In this time frame, the incentive 
constraints take the form 
                                                
1  The strategy we propose is stationary, i.e. it is time-invariant.  Because of the relatively 
complex structure of the game, it is conceivable that players could adopt time-varying 
strategies.  Our view is that the most obvious manner in which strategies would change 
over time is linked to the potential for entry, which differentiates periods iin epoch 1 (t ≤ 
T1) from periods in epoch 2 (t ≥ T1 + 1).  It is also true that periods in epoch 2 prior to T2 
differ from period T2 and after, in that it is common knowledge the probability the game 
will terminate during the first set of dates is nil.  The discussion in the text can be adapted 
to incorporate this additional complication, but at the cost of complicating the exposition.  
πnd2 + θπnN/(1 − θ) ≤ πnc2/(1 − θ) ⇔ πnd2 - πnc2 ≤ θ(πnd2 - πnN). (A1) 
There are two versions of this constraint, one for n = 2 and one for n = 3.  Next, consider 
values of t in epoch 2 prior to T2.  Here, the incentive constraints take the form  
πnd2 + (T2-t-1)πnN + πnN/(1 − θ) ≤ πnc2(T2 – t) + πnc2/(1 − θ)  
⇔ πnd2 - πnc2 ≤ (1 − θ)(T2 – t)( πnc2 - πnN) + θ(πnd2 - πnN),    (A2) 
Clearly, the right-hand side of (A2) is larger than the right-hand side of (A1) for any t < 
T2.  Accordingly, we can ignore this constraint.  Finally, consider values of t in epoch 1 
(i.e., t ≤ T1).  Here, the incentive constraints take the form  
π2d1 + (T1-t)π2N + (T2-T1)EπN + EπN/(1-θ) ≤ π2c1 + (T1-t)π2c2 + (T2-T1)Eπc2 + Eπc2/(1-θ), 
where EπN = λπ2N + (1-λ)π3N and Eπc2 = λπ2c2 + (1-λ)π3c2.  This constraint is tightest at t 
= T1, where it reduces to 
(π2d1 - π2c1) ≤ {(1-θ)(T2-T1) + 1}(Eπc2-EπN)/(1-θ).  (A3) 
If the constraint in (A3) is not binding, then an increase in λ – for example, from 0 to 
some positive level – need not have any impact on π2d1 - π2c1.  But if the constraint is 
binding, so that full collusion is not feasible, then the impact of an increase in λ upon π2d1 
- π2c1 will be proportional to the impact of an increase in λ upon Eπc2-EπN.  Using the 
definitions of Eπc2 and EπN given above,  
Eπc2-EπN = λ[π2c2- π2N – (π3c2- π3N)] + π3c2- π3N. 
It follows that  
∂(π2d1 - π2c1)/∂λ ∝ π2c2- π3c2 – (π2N - π3N), 
the difference between the reduction in cooperative profits and the reduction in Cournot 
profits as industry size increases from 2 to 3.  If the drop in in Cournot profits exceeds the 
drop in in cooperative profits, then an increase in λ will induce less cooperative 
behaviour in epoch 1.  This condition can hold for a variety of market structures, 
including the linear-quadratic framework we employ in our experimental design.2  Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 can hold under the assumed condition that perfect collusion is not feasible 
and players adopt the strategy σ.  
 The potential for entry induces firms to increase output during epoch 1 because 
this threat lowers the expected reward from continued cooperation in epoch 2.  But the 
resultant expected reward is surely larger than the actual reward that would obtain in a 
triopoly.  Accordingly, the incentives to cooperate are larger in a design where entry is 
probabilistic than in a design where the industry size has already been set at 3.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 2 will hold so long as firms are not irrationally aggressive. 
 
                                                
2  Let the cooperative profit πnc2 be a convex combination of fully collusive profits πnM 
and the Cournot profits πnN, with weight γ placed on πnM.  Suppose in contrast to the 
statement in the text that this weight does not change between n = 2 and 3.  It is 
straightforward to show that the reduction in collusive profit when n increases from 2 to 3 
equals 1/6 of monopoly profit, while the reduction in Cournot profit when n increases 
from 2 to 3 cooperative is 7/36 of monopoly profit.  Thus, Cournot profits fall faster than 
collusive profits, as n increases from 2 to 3.  We conclude that the constraint (A3) 
becomes tighter when n increases from 2 to 3.  
